Extraterritorial Effects of Foreign Tax Credit, Termination of Deferral and United States Tax Characterization by Pugh, Richard C.
586 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
with the business, is considered "effectively connected" unless there is a trea-
ty. This is not the simplest area of the tax law and I hope President Carter is
able to simplify it. As I mentioned, it is hard to justify some of these distinc-
tions.
You ordinarily find that U.S. tax is imposed on the U.S. source income of
the foreign person, as income is not ordinarily "effectively connected" unless
it is U.S. source income. But there are certain categories of foreign source in-
come which are treated as "effectively connected" and taxed by the United
States. This is income which is earned by a U.S. office of a foreign person
which we could perfectly well have called domestic source income. However,
we had old source rules that we were reluctant to change. Instead of changing
the source rules, we said that even though it is foreign source income, we will
tax it if it meets certain tests.
It is important to note that in the case of business-type income, all normal
deductions are available; the United States is most generous in allowing deduc-
tions to foreigners for expenses incurred overseas. The rates of tax are at the
normal corporate rates. For foreign individuals, there is a problem in that if
they are married, they cannot take advantage of the 50 percent maximum tax.
There are some other areas we are not going to discuss, so I thought I would
just list them so we will have to keep them in mind. Indirect taxes which are
basically state sales taxes. Social Security taxes have to be taken into account;
foreigners come here for a short time, or Americans go abroad-U.S. and
foreign Social Security taxes apply. We have estate taxes under the same situa-
tions, Americans abroad, foreigners here. Customs duties are obviously an in-
ternational tax. Dave Foster is going to say a word about the Zenith case. So
far I talked about the federal system in the United States. But most states of
the United States have income taxes and other taxes which are generally far
less accommodating to international transactions of U.S. persons than the
federal system. However, the level is much lower and such taxes are deductible
for federal purposes. Dave Foster is going to say a bit about the situation in
California.
In conclusion, the cornerstone of our system is the foreign tax credit and the
fact that we have a distinction between U.S. persons and foreign persons. Dick
Pugh will now tell you about the foreign tax credit in more detail, and about
how the distinction between domestic taxpayers and foreign taxpayers could
be blurred under possible legislative proposals.
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Thank you, Bob. I would like to touch on certain aspects of the foreign tax
credit this afternoon, the proposed elimination of what we call deferral and, if
time permits, certain characterizations that are used in the Internal Revenue
Code in taxing foreign income. The existing and proposed provisions I want to
comment on do not represent extraterritorial applications of U.S. legislative
jurisdiction, as such. That is, they don't involve an attempt to subject non-
U.S. persons to U.S. tax when they have no income from or contacts with the
United States. But these provisions can have important consequences on the
profitability of business operations that are conducted abroad by a U.S. com-
pany and so, to that extent, I think it is fair to say that they have some very
significant extraterritorial implications.
Proposals to Repeal the Foreign Tax Credit
Most of you are aware that, over the last few years, some considerable sup-
port has been expressed for the view that we ought to repeal the foreign tax
credit outright, in favor of simply granting a deduction for foreign income tax-
es. This was one of the features, you will recall, of the Burke-Hartke Bill sup-
ported strongly by the U.S. labor movement. Happily, I think now one can say
that this proposal seems to have little or no current momentum. The
Rostenkowski Task Force Report opposed elimination of the foreign tax
credit. Corporations based in every major trading country in the world enjoy
protection from double taxation internationally either by a foreign tax credit,
or by an exemption from domestic tax for foreign-source income. Unilateral
repeal by the United States of the foreign tax credit would have a devastating
extraterritorial effect on the capacity of U.S. companies to compete abroad.
The predictable result, I think, would be a sharp reduction in the volume of
new U.S.-foreign investment and a probable withdrawal of a substantial
amount of the existing foreign investment of U.S. companies.
Dave, perhaps you would like to comment on my generalization that the ef-
forts to eliminate the foreign tax credit appear to have lost most of their zip.
DAVID S. FOSTER: Dick, I think you are probably correct. I don't think it has
been seriously considered in connection with the current Carter tax reform
package, now being put together. Elimination of the foreign tax credit has
been considered by the Senate from time to time, but there does not seem to be
any great movement in that direction right now.
ROBERT COLE: May I interrupt? One of the questions now apparently being con-
sidered is an accidental repeal of the foreign tax credit. Dave, would you like
to explain that in a few sentences or should I?
DAVID FOSTER: You mean integration?
ROBERT COLE: Integration.
DAVID FOSTER: No, thank you.
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ROBERT COLE: This is my concern, but it is a real problem and, therefore, we
have to note it. A proposal to eliminate double taxation of corporate income is
being considered, under which shareholders would be given a credit for part of
the corporate tax paid by U.S. corporations. If the credit is based only on the
U.S. corporate tax paid by the distributing corporation, then on distributed
earnings the foreign tax credit would, in effect, be repealed. I hope that this is
not going to happen. But the Administration has to come up with a solution if
it proposes integration. I think there is a problem of an accidental tampering
with the foreign tax credit which the Carter Administration has to take into ac-
count.
RICHARD PUGH: I hope we can count on the Tax Section and the International
Law Section of the ABA to prevent that occurring, at least inadvertently.
DAVID FOSTER: Can I stick my two cents in here to say that I think that it is not
quite accurate to say that it may happen accidentally. I think people are aware
of the issue. In addition, I think it is worth pointing out that France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, have, in effect, repealed the foreign tax credit in
connection with integration but that Canada has not.
RICHARD PUGH: Dave, would you explain that again, about the lack of a foreign
tax credit in an integration system?
DAVID FOSTER: Well, if you have an integration system, it means that you give a
credit to the shareholder for the tax imposed on the corporation. The problem
arises when you have a corporation that has foreign income and, therefore,
does not pay any domestic tax because of the foreign tax credit. The issue is do
you then give credit at the shareholder level where foreign tax is paid at the
corporate level? That is done in Canada, in fact, because Canada ignores the
tax rate paid by the company itself.
WILLIAM COVENEY: Right, but it is not done in the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany, in that they will impose a special tax in cases where there is no
general domestic corporate tax paid. There is a special tax equal to the credit
that they will give to the shareholders.
ROBERT COLE: I cannot resist. It is not three to one; it is three to two. Belgium
has the Canadian System.
DAVID FOSTER: I am sorry, right.
RICHARD PUGH: One extraterritorial consequence of the foreign tax credit has a
particular impact in the developing countries and I would like now to comment
on that consequence. This is the possibility of cancelling the benefit of tax in-
centives adopted by developing countries, particularly tax holidays for desired
investments, as the result of the operation of the foreign tax credit.
A very large number of developing countries have adopted special tax incen-
tive regimes to encourage the inflow of foreign capital and technology. Promi-
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nant among these incentives are "tax holidays," under which the generally ap-
plicable income taxes on business income are reduced or more commonly
eliminated altogether for an initial period of an investment. Commonly, the
period runs from five to ten years. The corporate income tax is the tax most
often forgiven under these incentive programs. But in some cases in order to
encourage the inflow of needed technology, exemptions are also granted from
the normally applicable withholding taxes on royalties or technical assistance
fees, and sometimes withholding taxes on interest and dividends are also
forgiven under these tax incentive programs. Under the usual foreign tax credit
mechanism, however, the benefit of the exemption from foreign tax is can-
celled when the income enjoying the tax holiday is remitted to the multina-
tional company's home country. In effect, the taxes that are waived by the
developing host country are paid, instead, to the Treasury of the multinational
company's home country.
A distinction in this connection ought to be drawn between the waiver of
taxes on corporate income of a subsidiary organized in a developing host coun-
try, on the one hand, and the waiver of withholding taxes normally imposed
on royalties and technical service fees on the other.
Waiver of corporate income taxes by a developing country is normally not
cancelled by taxes in the multinational's home country as long as the earnings
of the foreign subsidiary are reinvested rather than distributed. Only upon
distribution of the earnings as dividends or otherwise are the tax concessions in
the developing country cancelled by taxes imposed on the shareholder by his
home country. Thus, in the short term, the cancellation effect of the U.S.
foreign tax credit creates an incentive to reinvest the earnings of a foreign sub-
sidiary benefitting from a foreign tax holiday. Eventually, on repatriation of
the earnings, the benefit of the tax holdiay is cancelled. In the case of waived
taxes on royalties and technical assistance fees, however, the cancellation ef-
fect is automatic and immediate.
In order to prevent the frustration of tax concessions granted by developing
countries, a large number of the principal capital- and technology-exporting
countries of the world, with the notable exception of the United States, have
adopted, either as a matter of domestic law or in their international double tax
treaties with developing countries, the concept of a tax-sparing credit under
which the taxes waived or spared by the developing country are treated as if
they actually had been paid for purposes of computing foreign tax credits-so
that the foreign tax waived is treated as a tax that offsets the domestic tax oq
the income from the developing country that would otherwise be imposed.
Countries utilizing the tax-sparing credit technique number at least four-
teen, and prominent among them are Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. It has been reported that there are at least seventy-five double tax
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treaties that incorporate a tax-sparing credit. A number of other capital- and
know-how-exporting countries, as Bob indicated, provide an exemption for
foreign-source income, and this also, of course, avoids the problem of cancell-
ing tax holidays that are granted in the developing country. Countries in this
category include Canada, through its tax treaties, France, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands.
The United States in the late 1950s and 1960 negotiated four tax treaties with
tax-sparing credit provisions, but none of the tax-sparing credit provisions
ever became effective. Tax-sparing credits were actively opposed by the
Treasury until 1968 and support for the concept has not since been revived in
the United States although its use by countries with which we compete has con-
tinued to increase.
Tax-sparing credits have been criticized on the ground that tax holidays are
not sound fiscal policy for developing countries. However valid this comment
may be, this criticism does seem somewhat gratuituous and somewhat ar-
rogant in view of the very large number of developing countries that have con-
cluded otherwise. They have determined that tax holidays do have a beneficial
effect in attracting foreign capital.
A concept of international tax neutrality has often been cited in opposition
to a tax-sparing credit. This neutrality is one under which the objective is to
subject the income of a U.S. corporation from foreign sources and its income
from domestic sources to the same total U.S. and foreign tax burden. This
might be called domestic-market or capital-export neutrality. The focus is on
equalizing the U.S. taxpayer's tax burden on U.S. and foreign income. A quite
different concept of international tax neutrality could be called foreign-market
or capital-import neutrality, under which the goal is to insure that a subsidiary
corporation established in foreign country X by a multinational company is
subject to the same income tax burden as other corporations established in
country X, which are owned by nationals of that country or by nationals of the
third country. Tax-sparing credits are compatible with foreign-market or
capital-import neutrality, but not domestic-market or capital-export neutrali-
ty.
But analysisit seems to me, of whether tax-sparing credits should be
adopted by the United States is not much advanced by citing their compatibili-
ty with one form of tax neutrality or another. What must be evaluated is what
the objectives are of our foreign economic policy in relation to the developing
countries and to what extent, if at all, tax incentives should be enlisted in sup-
port of these objectives.
Recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code have eliminated the pot-
pourri of preexisting so-called tax incentives to investment in developing coun-
tries. In general, these incentives were ill-conceived, or ineffective, or both,
and I don't believe that their repeal necessarily implies a rejection by Congress
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of the concept of providing effective tax incentives to encourage the flow of
capital and technology to the developing countries.
In the context of the reexamination of the most basic features of the U.S.
taxation of foreign income, which now appears to be in progress, I would sub-
mit that a thorough reexamination of our tax policy concerning investments
in, and income from, developing countries ought to be undertaken.
The disparities in wealth and the resultant economic tensions between the
countries of the North and the countries of the South-the haves and haves
nots-continue to mount. I think a persuasive case can be made for encourag-
ing private capital and private technology to make as great a contribution as
possible to narrowing the gap; and it may well be that U.S. tax incentives can
make a real contribution to encouraging the flow of private capital and
technology to the developing countries. The other members of the OECD have
concluded that a tax-sparing credit has a significant contribution to make. I
am inclined to think that they are right and that the United States should
emulate their example; but the most important thing is that we take a new look
at our tax policy in this area and that we not be captives of the past and of
question-begging notions of what kind of tax neutrality ought to be our goal.
I suspect that tax-sparing credits would not be as effective in inducing
private capital and technology to flow to developing countries as other alter-
natives. Tax-sparing credits are tied to income flows on which the taxes are
waived. Thus, the incentive they offer is less direct than investment credits or
deductible reserves, both of which could be related directly to the amount of
new investment that was sought to be encouraged. It is interesting, I think,
that France, Germany, and Japan all have the concept of deductible reserves
for certain investments in developing countries. They permit between 50 per-
cent and 100 percent of a new investment to be set up in reserve that is deducti-
ble in year one, subject to later recapture if the investment proves to be pro-
fitable. You will recall that a couple of U.S. tax treaties with developing coun-
tries were negotiated back in the early 1960s with a special investment tax
credit for certain new investment. These investments credit provisions,
however, never became effective. And the Johnson Administration, I believe,
proposed at one point a substantial investment credit to encourage the flow of
private capital to the developing countries. If we decide that as a part of our
foreign economic policy private investment in developing countries should be
encouraged, let us examine the whole range of possibilities, even those that we
previously rejected, in considering whether tax incentives are appropriate and,
if they are, what incentives are likely to be the most effective.
Proposals to End Deferral
A general principle that is applied in all of the tax systems that I have had
any contact with is that the income of a foreign corporation the stock of which
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is owned by domestic shareholders is not subject to domestic tax unless and
until those earnings are distributed as a dividend or otherwise to the domestic
shareholders. In the United States, this principle has come to be known as the
deferral principle.* U.S. taxes on the earnings of a foreign corporation are
deferred until those earnings are distributed to U.S. shareholders.
There are a number of exceptions to the deferral principle. The most impor-
tant for our purposes are the special rules under which the undistributed
foreign personal holding company income of a foreign personal holding com-
pany and the undistributed subpart F income of a controlled foreign corpora-
tion may be taxed as a constructive dividend to U.S. shareholders.
These special exceptions were made to the deferral principle to meet what we
regarded as special tax avoidance problems associated with the use of foreign
tax haven companies. But for the treatment of foreign personal holding com-
pany income of foreign personal holding companies as a constructive dividend
to its U.S. shareholders, those shareholders could avoid current U.S. tax on
their investment income by accumulating that income in a foreign corporation
located in a tax haven. But for the similar treatment of the Subpart F income
of controlled foreign corporations, certain types of income such as dividends,
interest, rents, royalties, certain income from the rendering of services abroad
and from international sales could be accumulated free of U.S. tax in a tax
haven corporation and be used for additional investment abroad.
There appeared to be no jurisdictional basis under international law for im-
posing U.S. tax directly on the non-U.S.-source income of the foreign cor-
poration set up in a tax haven. The foreign corporation, albeit a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, was still regarded as a foreign person and as
long as it had no U.S.-source income, the foreign corporation itself could not
be subject to U.S. tax. Accordingly, the expedient was adopted of taxing, not
the foreign corporation, but the U.S. shareholder as if he had received a divi-
dend equal to his share of the foreign corporation's undistributed income fall-
ing into certain categories. Although this approach involved taxing the U.S.
shareholder on a constructive distribution of income he did not actually
receive, its constitutionality has been sustained and now appears beyond any
reasonable question, at least insofar as controlled foreign corporations and
foreign personal holding companies are concerned.
Treating the certain categories of undistributed income of a controlled
foreign corporation as a constructive dividend, and thereby ending effectively
*Deferral tends to be a "loaded" term, which implies an unwarranted tax concession. This is
ironical since it denotes the principle adopted by all of the major trading countries of the free
world. In any event, the term's wide currency and convenience have resulted in its general use by
proponents as well as opponents.
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the deferral of U.S. tax, may have some important extraterritorial conse-
quences. For example, suppose a U.S. manufacturing company established an
international sales company in Bermuda and a Japanese competitor did the
same. The income of the U.S. company's Bermuda sales company from
foreign sales outside Bermuda of U.S. manufactured goods would, under sub-
part F, be immediately subject to the U.S. 48 percent corporate tax as con-
structive dividend.
ROBERT COLE: Could I interrupt you just a second? Could you, in three
sentences, define a controlled foreign corporation, foreign personal holding
company, and subpart F income, for those who are not familiar with these
concepts?
RICHARD PUGH: A controlled foreign corporation, briefly, is a foreign corpora-
tion of which more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power is
owned, directly, indirectly or constructively, by five or fewer than ten percent
U.S. shareholders. A foreign personal holding company is a foreign corpora-
tion of which more than 50 percent in value of the stock is owned, directly, in-
directly or constructively, by five or fewer individuals who are U.S. citizens or
residents and at least 60 percent of the income of which constitutes passive-
type income, such as dividends or royalties, and the like.
Subpart F income, which is the kind of income that is treated as a construc-
tive dividend in the case of a controlled foreign corporation, has a number of
components. The principal ones are items such as dividends, interest,
royalties, rents, income from sales of goods produced outside the foreign com-
pany's country and sold outside that country and certain forms of personal
service income. These types of income are included in the definition of subpart
F income and this income can be treated as a constructive dividend distribution
to U.S. shareholders under subpart F.
Getting back to my Bermuda sales company, the sales income of the U.S.
company's Bermuda sales company would be what is called foreign base com-
pany sales income-one of the components of subpart F income-and would
be taxed immediately in the United States as a constructive dividend. On the
other hand, the income of the Japanese company's sales subsidiary would not
be subject to current-tax. This obviously has an extraterritorial effect in that
the Japanese company is in a better overall position to compete in foreign
markets than is the U.S. company as a result of this difference in taxation.
This adverse extraterritorial effect on the competitiveness of the U.S.
manufacturer can be justified in the context of dealing with the use of tax
havens to avoid U.S. tax on export income. But, obviously, it would be
preferable if all of the major trading competitors of the United States could be
persuaded to penalize tax haven operations in a similar way since this would
eliminate the competitive distortions which are present currently. So far,
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 3
594 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
however, only two of the members of the OECD, Canada and the Federal
Republic of Germany, have taken effective steps to restrict the use of foreign
tax havens by domestic shareholders, the German approach being quite similar
to our own subpart F.
The potential adverse extraterritorial effects of eliminating deferral become
particularly significant when we evaluate the proposal that is now under con-
sideration by the Administration-the proposal that the deferral of U.S. tax be
eliminated on all types of income of controlled foreign corporations, not just
subpart F income.
There have been a variety of proposals in recent years under which not only
the subpart F income of controlled foreign corporations, but all income, in-
cluding manufacturing income, all sorts of sales income, and all sorts of ser-
vice income would be treated as a constructive dividend to the U.S. Persons
owning, directly, indirectly, or constructively, at least 10% of the voting
power of a controlled foreign corporation. Those supporting these proposals
to end deferral altogether tend to stress the goal of domestic-market or capital-
export neutrality-equalizing the income tax burden of U.S. taxpayers on both
their foreign and their U.S.-source income.
At this point, I would like to commend to your reading an extremely in-
teresting article written by David Foster and Gary Hufbauer on the problems
of deferral. It is a very comprehensive piece of work and an extremely in-
teresting one. It was published by the Treasury early this year in a volume
dedicated to the late Nathan Gordon, who was formerly in charge of the tax
treaty program. In this article, David points out that to achieve the objective
of domestic-market neutrality completely, all of the U.S. tax benefits that ap-
ply to domestic income, such as the investment tax credit which now applies
only to U.S., not foreign, property, the Asset Depreciation Range method of
calculating depreciation deductions and the DISC benefits, would all have to
be extended to foreign income as well. And, in addition, in cases in which
foreign taxes exceeded U.S. taxes, the Treasury would have to grant to the tax-
payer a cash refund or the taxpayer would have to be granted a foreign tax
credit to permit recoupment of the excess of the foreign taxes over the U.S.
taxes applicable. Furthermore, there would have to be an immediate utiliza-
tion of foreign losses for U.S. tax purposes. Changes such as these that Would
really be required to reach what is referred to as pure domestic-market
neutrality aren't usually proposed by those who support the ending of defer-
ral. They may not be supported in part because they have very severe revenue
implications. In David's article, it was pointed out that estimates made in 1976
indicated that, if pure domestic-market or capital-export neutrality were
achieved, there would be a revenue loss of $1.2 billion.
ROBERT COLE: Dick, I think Dave's article has had an effect. I had an occasion
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to listen to one of the important academic tax reformers recently, and he said
that after thinking about those points, especially investment credit and the
ADR, he realized there would be no revenue gains from ending deferral, and
tax reformers have really lost interest in that as a cause.
RICHARD PUGH: Not only there would be no revenue gain, but there would be a
revenue loss.
The chief objection though, I think, to restricting or terminating deferral is
that in any case in which the corporate tax rate of a foreign country is lower
than the U.S. 48 percent rate, it would increase the tax burden on un-
distributed earnings of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. shareholders in
ralation to the tax burden borne by foreign corporations in that country con-
trolled by non-U.S. competitors. Therefore, it would impair the competitive
position of U.S. corporations in foreign markets and in the U.S. market to the
extent that foreign competitors are supplying the U.S. market from manufac-
turing subsidiaries located in low-tax countries. The adverse extraterritorial ef-
fect on after-tax return increases as the foreign tax rate falls below the U.S.
rate and it is at its peak when the foreign subsidiary enjoys a foreign tax holi-
day.
Thus, the consequences of terminating deferral would be particularly
adverse with respect to investments by U.S.-based multinationals in companies
organized in less developed countries where tax holidays are common and
where tax rates in general are lower than the U.S. rates. There would be an im-
mediate cancellation of any tax exemption or any tax differential even with
respect to the undistributed income of the foreign subsidiary. This would
presumably result in considerable resentment in the developing countries and
would certainly increase the need for a tax-sparing credit or some other relief.
It could also result in fiscal retaliation of the less developed countries. For
example, they might enact what has been called a "sponge" tax, under which
tax holidays would be terminated if the elimination of deferral would result in
their cancellation through the operation of the U.S. foreign tax credit. Thus,
the foreign tax would in effect be raised in order to soak up what would other-
wise be the U.S. tax on the undistributed income of the company in the less
developed country. Egypt is an example of a less developed country that per-
mits tax relief for foreign investors only if the investor's home country does
not tax the income of the Egyptian company, either when it is earned or when
it is ultimately distributed. The less developed countries could also impose
heavy withholding taxes on the constructive dividends that would be the
mechanism for taxing undistributed income to U.S. shareholders.
WILLIAM CAVENEY: Dick, I should make a point about the Canadian tax system,
because your discussion has been tied into the less developed countries, which
are generally what comes to mind when you consider the "tax holidays." But
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when the Treasury Department's tax holiday legislative proposals were
brought up about four years ago (and in the March, 1977, Rostenkowski Task
Force Report), the definition of tax holiday included a country which had very
rapid depreciation policies. In some situations you can read that as "Canada,"
because Canada is famous for its writeoff in only two years of manufacturing
and processing plants and equipment. A company can build a $400 million
plant, and write it off in two years-if it can otherwise absorb the deduction.
Thus, there is a lot of concern in Canada about its being defined as a tax
holiday, if fast depreciation policies were to be exempted (in any anti-deferral
legislation by the U.S.) for only less developed countries. In the past, the two-
year writeoff was denied to companies that did not have a "degree of Cana-
dian ownership" (i.e., 25 percent or more). The present law does not have such
a discriminatory limitation, but the limitation requiring Canadian ownership
could easily be reinstituted by simply changing the tax law, if the so-called
deferral is eliminated by the United States.
RICHARD PUGH: I might cite yet another example of what the less developed
countries might do in reaction to termination of deferral. They have the option
always of not granting tax incentives, but granting other sorts of subsidies and
cash grants as an alternative. This would encourage the inflow of capital
without reducing their taxes in cases in which that reduction would be can-
celled under the U.S. foreign tax credit.
To wrap this portion up, it seems to me that if the other major trading coun-
tries terminated deferral, that would be okay. This would eliminate the com-
petitive distortions that would result from our going down the road alone in
this direction. For the United States to take the solitary lead on this issue is
fraught with risks to the long-term prospects of U.S. industry abroad, par-
ticularly in the less developed countries where the principal impact of terminat-
ing deferral would be felt.
In a 1974 survey of sixty-three countries, it was reported that twenty-six had
corporate and dividend withholding taxes above the U.S. corporate rate. So
there would not be any adverse effect to our investments in those countries as a
result of eliminating deferral; but thirty-seven countries had tax rates lower
than ours, and all but ten of these were developing countries. Obviously, that
is where the elimination of deferral would really bite and I think could have
serious long-term adverse implications.
I don't think we have time here to discuss the variety of proposals that fall
short of complete elimination of deferral, but there are some interesting ones
and I will just note them. You can see that some of them have much less
adverse impact on the developing countries than others. These would include
the proposal to require distribution of at least 50 percent of all kinds of the in-
come of controlled foreign corporations. The 50 percent would either have to
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be actually distributed each year or would be deemed to be constructively
distributed. Another proposal is that to the extent that earnings of a controlled
foreign corporation are not needed in the business of that controlled foreign
corporation, they would be deemed distributed as constructive dividends if
they were not actually distributed. Another proposal is aimed, as Bill in-
dicated, at tax holiday situations. Any case in which a controlled foreign cor-
poration enjoyed a tax holiday, or exported a substantial portion of its output
to the United States-that is the "run-away plant" situation-its income
would be deemed distributed to the U.S. shareholder.
Finally, there are a variety of proposals that involve permitting deferral for
a limited period of time, maybe five years. There would be no constructive
distribution of the earnings of a controlled foreign corporation until the end of
a period of five years or more during which those earnings could be ac-
cumulated.
Thus, it may be that if any form of deferral legislation is ultimately adopted,
it will be something short of the complete elimination of deferral on the
manufacturing and other income of controlled foreign corporations. As the
debate progresses, I think it is of crucial importance to keep in mind the
adverse impact that the elimination or the restriction of deferral may have on
our position in the less-developed countries.
United States Tax Characterizations with
Extraterritorial Effects
One technique that recurs at various points in the U.S. taxation of foreign
income is the use of U.S. concepts in characterizing and quantifying foreign-
source income, in characterizing foreign taxes for purposes of the foreign tax
credit and in characterizing foreign legal entities. In each case, these
characterizations can have important implications with respect to the after-tax
profitability of a foreign investment.
I may have time later to get into some of the others, but for the moment, I
think I will just consider the use of U.S. concepts in characterizing foreign
taxes for purposes of deciding whether foreign taxes qualify as creditable taxes
for purposes of the foreign tax credit. In order to qualify, they have to be in-
come taxes or they have to be taxes in lieu of income taxes and we use our own
concepts in determining whether a foreign tax so qualifies.
There are some interesting current issues pending, particularly in the
mineral, oil and gas area. One arises in the context of the production-sharing
agreements that have become common between U.S. oil companies and
foreign government-owned oil companies in various countries where oil ex-
ploration and production is in process. For example, a ruling was issued by the
Internal Revenue Service last year (Revenue Ruling 76-215) involving Per-
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tamina and production-sharing arrangements in Indonesia. Under these ar-
rangements, the foreign government, in this case the Indonesian Government,
owns all of the oil and gas and an entity wholly-owned by that government,
Pertamina, has the exclusive rights of exploration and development and has
ultimate control over exploration and development and production. The U.S.
company furnishes capital, technical, and managerial know-how and services
in return for a share of production. The law of Indonesia provides that the
government-owned oil company is to pay the government itself a percentage of
the government-owned oil company's production share. And under Indone-
sian law, this payment by the foreign government-owned oil company to the
foreign government constitutes the payment of all the tax liabilities of the U.S.
oil company that is actually carrying out the exporation and development. In
its ruling, the IRS held that the production share that is paid on behalf of the
U.S. oil company by Pertamina to the Indonesian Government is not a foreign
income tax, and, therefore, no foreign tax credit for the payment is available
to the U.S. oil company concerned.
The reasons given were essentially two: First, since the foreign government
already owns the oil and gas, there is no payment for or on behalf of the U.S.
company, and, second, the payment is really not an income tax but a royalty.
Bob, I think you have had some contact with that problem.
ROBERT COLE: What is very interesting about the problem is that
negotiations-three-way negotiations-are now in progress between the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, the U.S. oil companies, and the Government of In-
donesia to try to revise the Indonesian law to meet the requirements of the In-
ternal Revenue Service as to what constitutes an income tax under U.S. con-
cepts.
RICHARD PUGH: I gather that characterization issues are also alive now with
respect to payments made by certain U.S. oil companies that are operating in
the Middle Eastern OPEC countries and with respect to the U.K. Petroleum
Revenue Tax.
ROBERT COLE: Dave, would you like to say something about this problem in the
case of the U.K? How is the definition of an income tax being handled?
DAVID FOSTER: The issue is whether the Petroleum Revenue Tax imposed by
United Kingdom in the North Sea is a creditable income tax. The Internal
Revenue Service took the informal position in a memo to Treasury two years
ago that it was not, and the proposed treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom provides that it should be treated as an income tax for treaty
purposes.
The way I said that sounds a little different from what really happened. The
decision to make it creditable for treaty purposes was made before the time the
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Service took its position. That is, just as a routine matter of renegotiating a
treaty, it is normal to take a look at the taxes of the other country and specify
which ones are creditable income taxes.
RICHARD PUGH: Just one final illustration of characterization problems. One
that recurs with some frequency is the problem of characterizing foreign legal
entities for U.S. tax purposes.
Important U.S. tax consequences may turn on whether an entity organized
under foreign law will be characterized as a partnership or a corporation for
U.S. tax purposes. The characterization is accomplished by using U.S. con-
cepts and the result can be extraterritorial in the sense that the current after-tax
return on investment may be affected importantly by the U.S. tax
characterization.
For example, if a foreign legal entity is established, it may be taxed as a com-
pany in the foreign jurisdiction and yet may be characterized as a partnership
for U.S. tax purposes. Such characterization implies immediate U.S. income
tax on the income of the foreign enterprise, whether or not the income is remit-
ted to the United States. With the exceptions noted above, if the foreign entity
is characterized as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, its undistributed earn-
ings will not be subject to U.S. income tax. Loss of this deferral will have an
impact on after-tax profitability whenever the foreign enterprise is subject to
foreign corporate tax of less than 48 percent or is exempt from foreign cor-
porate tax. There are, in addition, a number of special rules applicable to con-
trolled foreign corporations that can come into play only if the foreign entity is
classified for U.S. tax purposes as a corporation.
If the foreign legal entity is not characterized as a corporation for U.S.
federal income tax purposes, tax deductions and losses of the entity can be
taken currently as deductions for U.S. tax purposes. This may be particularly
important when losses are expected during an initial start-up period. This fac-
tor, indeed, may make it desirable to inaugurate a foreign investment in an
unincorporated business form and to convert to a business form characterized
as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes after the period of initial losses is over
and profitable operations commence. In addition, only if the foreign entity is
treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes will the U.S. participant enjoy
the U.S. tax benefits accorded to U.S. taxpayers in connection with mineral
operations, such as percentage depletion with respect to solid minerals and
deductibility of intagible drilling and development costs in oil or gas ventures
and of exploration and development costs in solid mineral ventures. If the
foreign business entity is treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes, it will
be considered to be a foreign corporation which is not entitled to these
benefits.
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